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Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Massó, Jordi - In: Review of economic design : RED 11 (2007) 3, pp. 175-184

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578000

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486876

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011628386

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319

Median Stable Matching for College Admission

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408

Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122

Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Massó, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547404

Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547436

Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets

Klaus, Bettina - Harvard Business School, Harvard University - 2007

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005754944

Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Harvard Business School, Harvard University - 2009

We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain … with transitivity of blocking leads to an elementary proof of the so-called stable median matching theorem, showing how the …-sided matching problems. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005754964