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Easy targets and the timing of conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2003

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367925

Easy targets and the timing of conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - Center for European, Governance and Economic … - 2003

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010954362

Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 17 (2005) 2, pp. 199-215

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010778031

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264689

Easy targets and the timing of conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - 2003

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300172

Easy targets and the timing of conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - 2003

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307026

Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the … - 2003

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763436

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005548380

Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123608

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134