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Information alliances in contests with budget limits
Konrad, Kai A. - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2010
We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget … for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn … alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397096
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Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances
Konrad, Kai A. - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2011
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397103
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Information alliances in contests with budget limits
Konrad, Kai A. - 2010
We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget … for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn … alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307679
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Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances
Konrad, Kai A. - 2011
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307683
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Easy targets and the timing of conflict
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2003
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367925
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Easy targets and the timing of conflict
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - Center for European, Governance and Economic … - 2003
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010954362
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Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 17 (2005) 2, pp. 199-215
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010778031
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Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans
Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2007
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264689
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Easy targets and the timing of conflict
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - 2003
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300172
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Easy targets and the timing of conflict
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - 2003
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307026