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Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans
Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2007
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action … in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264689
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Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans
Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für … - 2007
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action … in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005548380
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Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans
Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action … in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134
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Multi-battle contests
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835218
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Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-Of-War.
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2005
by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835345
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2014
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202941
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Delay in contests
Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2002
Why is there delay in contests? In this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate, and if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367853
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Strategy in contests: an introduction
Konrad, Kai A. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2007
, R&D contests, electoral competition in political markets, military conflict and sports. I survey here this type of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367917
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Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances
Konrad, Kai A. - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2011
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397103
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Brothers in arms: An experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2010
outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however …, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397117