In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

In this paper we show that if the Pareto relation is acyclic then the set of all Pareto optimal social states coincides with chosen social states of acyclic Paretian social welfare relations. Subsequently we show that given an acyclic Paretian social welfare relations the set of all social...

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

In this paper we consider choice correspondences which may be empty-valued. We study conditions under which such choice correspondences are rational, transitively rational, partially rational, partially almost transitive rational, partially almost quasi-transitive rational.

The purpose of this paper is to replicate the theory developed by Gekker (2001), without using any monotonicity assumption. We however retain a non-triviality assumption implicit in Gekker (2001), which says that there is at least one opportunity set which is preferred to the no-choice...

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.