In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

In this paper we present some results for preference aggregation functionals defined on rich admissible sets. Our results are concerned with an Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption due to Alan D. Taylor suitably adjusted to be applicable in the framework of preference aggregation...

We consider functions that assign to each evaluation profile a preference system or a list of menu dependent preferences. The rule by which such an assignment takes place is said to be a menu dependent preference functional (MDPFL). We extend the concepts of invariance under individual cardinal...

In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the maxmin choice correspondence for a decision maker who has state-dependent preferences (represented by a linear order) over the set of alternatives

We introduce the concept of a social choice functional and provide two axiomatic characterizations of the utilitarian social choice functional. Subsequently we consider Harsanyi's weighted utilitarianism and establish two more propositions concerning the same. While the first is an axiomatic...

We show that any group (or multi-criteria) choice correspondence which satisfies the weak Pareto criterion and the Majority condition must violate the no-spoiler property. Subsequently we strengthen the weak Pareto criterion. We show that if the number of criteria or individuals or states of...

In this paper we are concerned with the following question. Given an extended preference ordering under what conditions does there exist an empirical stochastic/social choice function which generates it? We use Farkas' lemma to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition under which such a...