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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting : The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives
Armstrong, Chris - 2013
provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk … that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089871
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CEO pay at valeant : does extreme compensation create extreme risk?
Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2016
Valeant directly a result of the incentives placed on its CEO? Would they have occurred if the incentives were less aggressive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864729
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The relation between equity incentives and misreporting : the role of risk-taking incentives
Armstrong, Christopher; Larcker, David F.; Ormazabal, Gaizka - In: Journal of financial economics 109 (2013) 2, pp. 327-350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784188
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Mega Grants : Why Would a Board Approve Nine-Figure CEO Pay?
Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2023
Recent years have seen a reemergence of the practice of awarding “mega grants” to CEOs. Mega grants are large, one-time equity awards granted in lieu of or in addition to annual awards with the intended purpose of providing significant incentive to the CEO to achieve long-term targets. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014362013
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Governance aches and pains : is bad governance chronic?
Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2016
Institutional investors pay considerable attention to the quality of a company's governance. Unfortunately, it is difficult for outside observers to reliably gauge governance quality. Oftentimes, poor governance manifests itself only after decisions have been made and their outcomes known. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864693
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Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Stock Price : A New Tool for Assessing Pay for Performance
Larcker, David F. - 2013
incentives that the company is offering to its CEO. We also explain that it is important to review this information in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094304
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Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance
Core, John E.; Holthausen, Robert W.; Larcker, David F. - 2011
firms with more entrenched managers or poorer governance systems perform worse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222388
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Performance-Based Incentives for Internal Monitors
Armstrong, Chris - 2012
's production function, when other top managers receive greater incentives, and when a firm has lower expected litigation risk. We …This study examines the use of performance-based incentives for internal monitors (general counsel and chief internal … auditor) and whether these incentives impair monitors' independence by aligning their interests with the interests of those …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116383
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Stock options and chief executive officer compensation
Armstrong, Christopher (contributor);  … - 2007
) typically has option-like features over the most probable range of outcomes. -- Stock options ; incentives ; agency model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782064