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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762684
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593480
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102089
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Morris, Stephen; Mailath, George J - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051332
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109597
Cover Image
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730970
Cover Image
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996