We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, say, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences over the actions are...

We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a panel of biased experts. The decision-maker prefers to take an action in [0, 1] that matches the underlying state but relies on the experts to learn the state. Each expert has his `ideal` action or `agenda` and may conceal unfavorable...

We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, or, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences over the actions (i.e.,...

We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the effort provision are done by different workers (as...

We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the effort provision are done by different workers (as...