In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …

-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his … equilibrium and vice versa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are … competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of …

coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, and thus … they belong to the core. Moreover, under the assumption that all agents in the market are active, the subset of core … set of stable allocations where each agent is paid at least half of his maximum core payoff. All allocations in this last …

considering the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this matching. We prove in the … assignment game, have a lattice structure with respect to the same partial order usually defined on the core. …

the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We … prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and …

matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with … usually defined on the core. …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with …

is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationships between these … over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors), lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and … extreme core points. As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational payoff set, also the …

strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with … between core and competitive equilibria is established …

pays a unitary cost to obtain this technology. A coalitional cost game can be defined from this situation, and the core of … this game is known to be non- empty. We prove that the core of an information graph game is a von Neumann … the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, then a stable set always exists and it is the core of a …