In a repeated interaction between and a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

In the postal sector, the net cost of universal service depends on the content of the service, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the...

This article studies the behavior of the …rm when it is searching to …ll a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the …rm can o¤er two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. The short-term contract is like a probationary stage in which the …rm can learn...

Cet article explore le rôle de la demande de travail des personnes âgées dans l’analyse des politiques de retraite et de préretraite. Plus précisément, nous utilisons les travaux de Lazear(1979) pour étudier le profil des salaires optimal au cours d’une carrière et l’âge de la...

This paper analyzes, in a setup where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter, and only the agent knows its realization. If the principal delegates the control over the...

This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information. If the person who has the power to act, the principal, doesn't have the necessary information to make the best possible decision, she can address herself to someone, the agent, who has this...