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This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921779
This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158242
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003537257
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000977178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001535146
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332253
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332300
We consider the allotment problems of homogeneous indivisible objects among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that the rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332429
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929953
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008988868