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The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores
Shubik, Martin - 2003
Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The … possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074703
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The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762670
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The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006
A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762688
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A Computational Analysis of the Core of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria and a Finite Number of Traders
Shubik, Martin; Kumar, Alok - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number … of traders (N) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations … in individual initial endowments. Computational results show that the core first splits into two pieces at N = 5 and then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593218
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The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores of an Economy
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003
Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The … possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464037
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The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores
Shubik, Martin - School of Management, Yale University - 2004
Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The … possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178448
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Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements in Simple Games
Quint, Thomas; Shubik, Martin - 2004
A voting with absenteeism game is defined as a pair (G;r) where G is an n-player (monotonic) simple game and r is an n-vector for which r_{i} is the probability that player i attends a vote. We define a power index for such games, called the absentee index. We axiomatize the absentee index and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072631
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Chapter 62 Game theory and experimental gaming
Shubik, Martin - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2327-2351). 2002
This is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024483
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Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments
Qin, Chen-Zhong; Shapley, Lloyd S.; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
parameters specifying the interpersonal comparisons in the side-payment game. We study this game for the properties of the delta-core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479208
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A Note on Fairness, Power, Property, and Behind the Veil
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006
An Axiomatization for Power and for Equity differ only in the addition of a Behind the Veil Axiom.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593512