simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

are in the dark about what others are doing and how their own payo s are a ected. This paper analyzes learning behavior in … identify two key features of the players' learning dynamics. First, if a player's realized payoff increases he is less inclined …

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …

version of this idea, called interactive trial and error learning, which has the property that it implements Nash equilibrium …), the method requires no statistical estimation. Unlike a learning procedure proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (2006), it … requires no knowledge of the other players' actions: learning proceeds purely by responding to one's own payoff history. The …

simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

approximately) no matter what learning rule they use. The reason is that, in trying to predict the next-period behavior of an …

The paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of learning that lead to …

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …