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The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline
Lazear, Edward P. - 2003
Some have observed that individuals perform worse after being promoted. The Peter Principle, which states that people are promoted to their level of incompetence, suggests that something is fundamentally misaligned in the promotion process. This view is unnecessary and inconsistent with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262717
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Who benefits from benefits? Empirical research on tangible incentives
Hammermann, Andrea; Mohnen, Alwine - 2012
Although a broad field of literature on incentive theory exists, employer-provided tangible goods (hereafter called …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282164
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The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation
Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, C. Mirjam - 2008
than in the stable environment. This finding is in line with standard agency theory and contrasts a distinct element of … expectancy theory; noisier performance measures do not lower work motivation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325762
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The Pygmalion effect : an agency model with reference dependent preferences
Daido, Kohei; Itoh, Hideshi - 2005
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261169
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Knight fever : towards an economics of awards
Frey, Bruno S. - 2005
Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261193
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Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2004
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261219
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Potential, prizes and performance : testing tournament theory with professional tennis data
Sunde, Uwe - 2003
This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the … contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been … underlies any agency theory about elimination tournaments, and has been empirically tested in other contexts. The evidence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261647
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Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives
Nafziger, Julia - 2008
This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264916
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Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-person Contest Games
Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - 2009
This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265789
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Committing to incentives: Should the decision to sanction be revealed or hidden?
Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2010
Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce compliance by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267125