Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 12,680
Cover Image
Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Crowding-Effekte
Neunzig, Alexander R. - 2002
Für die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie ist es ein weitgehend ungelöstes Rätsel, warum reale Arbeitsverträge sehr geringe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296965
Cover Image
Mehraufgaben-Prinzipal-Agenten-Analyse: Effiziente Arbeitsverträge für abwechslungsbegrüßende Arbeitnehmer
Neunzig, Alexander R. - 2002
Für die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie ist es ein weitgehend ungelöstes Rätsel, warum reale Arbeitsverträge sehr geringe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296966
Cover Image
Effiziente Fixlohnverträge für arbeitsfreudige Arbeitnehmer mit Berichtspflichten
Neunzig, Alexander R. - 2002
Für die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie ist es ein weitgehend ungelöstes Rätsel, warum reale Arbeitsverträge sehr geringe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296967
Cover Image
Angst und Ärger: Zur Relevanz emotionaler Dimensionen sozialer Ungleichheit
Rackow, Katja; Schupp, Jürgen; Scheve, Christian von - In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 41 (2012) 5, pp. 392-409
, nämlich Angst und Ärger. Auf Grundlage von bevölkerungsrepräsentativen Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) zeigen wir …, Einkommen und Qualifikationsniveau – eigenständige Beiträge zur Erklärung der Häufigkeit des Empfindens von Angst und Ärger … the sociologically most relevant emotions, namely anger and anxiety. Using representative data from the German Socio …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327926
Cover Image
Optimism, pessimism and the unforeseen: Modelling an endogenous business cycle driven by strong beliefs
Sell, Friedrich L. - 2002
Indicators of trust, confidence, optimism or sentiment among consumers and/or investors, are published continuously in the mass media. More importantly, these indices seem not only to reflect how the state of the real economy is perceived by private agents, but can also help predict the future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300404
Cover Image
Monopolistic screening under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis - 2007
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315563
Cover Image
Project selection, income smoothing, and Bayesian learning
Gaber, Christian - 2003
Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide managerial incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316305
Cover Image
Stochastic adaption in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
Josephson, Jens - 2001
In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281436
Cover Image
Non-common priors, incentives, and promotions: The role of learning
Fahn, Matthias; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - 2023
Consider a repeated principal-agent setting with verifiable effort and an extra profit that can materialize only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident and updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The agent's principal-expected compensation decreases over time until high talent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374664
Cover Image
Overconfidence in a career-concerns setting
De La Rosa, Leonidas Enrique - 2008
We study the effects of overconfidence in a two-period investment-decision agency setting. Under common priors, agent risk aversion implies inefficiently low first-period investment. In our model, principal and agent disagree about the profitability of the investment decision conditional on a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276369