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Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

Moreno, Diego; Moscoso, María - In: Economic Theory 52 (2013) 1, pp. 315-336

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993622

Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

Maniquet, François; Sprumont, Yves - In: Economic Theory 14 (1999) 3, pp. 583-595

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370920

A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity

Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2005) 3, pp. 335-354

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375648

Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki - Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University - 2008

In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under … strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710066

Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem

Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es; Neme, … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823954

Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing

Ju, Biung-Ghi - Department of Economics, University of Kansas - 2003

rules satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. However, when aggregate uncertainty holds, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057394

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

RAMAEKERS, Eve; KAYI, Cagatay - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency … not know agents’ waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency … that even non-single-valued rules satisfy Pareto-efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness if and only if they select …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042819

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Serizawa, Shigehiro; Morimoto, Shuhei - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2

the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773117

Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 1-14

-proofness or efficiency. We show that stability is compatible with strategy-proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719484

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

Moreno, Diego; Moscoso, María José - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2010

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial -- i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838391

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