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“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">1950</CitationRef>) and that of...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988759
An IPV 2-bidder second-price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing: prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to depart from the auction, so that he (the briber) will become the sole participant and obtain the good for the reserve price. Bribes are offered sequentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321779
A bargaining solution balances fairness and efficiency if each player's payoff lies between the minimum and maximum of the payoffs assigned to him by the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions. In the 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash solution is the unique scale-invariant solution satisfying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324194
I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324195
I characterize the proportional N-person bargaining solutions by individual rationality, translation invariance, feasible set continuity, and a new axiom - interim improvement. The latter says that if the disagreement point d is known, but the feasible set is not - it may be either S or T, where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324196
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399909
A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each player's payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-loss solutions. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique scale-invariant 2-person solution with this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368519
In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate standard assumptions of rationality, we modify the standard model of preference aggregation to study the case in which neither individual nor collective preferences are required to satisfy transitivity or other coherence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672255
We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical players are about to participate in an independent-private-value first-price, sealed bid auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796265
I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678869