Showing 1 - 10 of 19
The process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved. <p>We show that on the class of...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375571
Previous studies present an extensive coverage of cloud computing as a disruptive technology. Building from these studies, the aim of this research was to gain more understanding of the innovation of the business model of customers as a result of adopting cloud service delivery models. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010925473
In a paper in 1975, Dubey characterized the Shapley-Shubik index axiomatically on the class of monotonic simple games. In 1979, Dubey and Shapley characterized the Banzhaf index in a similar way. This paper extends these characterizations to axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155754
The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's beliefs over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010637901
The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's beliefs over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672706
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709972
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005794253
The Ellsberg Paradox demonstrates that people's belief over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977025
The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187618
The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that peoples belief over uncertainevents might not be representable by subjective probability. We relate this paradox to other commonly observed anomalies, suchas a rejection of the backward induction prediction in the one-shot Ultimatum Game. We argue that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731447