We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents rather lie in such a way that they do not get caught. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive...

We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2012</CitationRef>) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power...</citationref>

Numerous simple proofs of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1977, Satterthwaite, 1975) has been given in the literature. These are based on a number of different intuitions about the most fundamental reason for the result. In this paper we derive the Gibbard-Satterthwaite...

The first full characterization of social choice correspondences that are implementable in Nash equilibrium, given in Moore and Repullo (1990), together with the working principle behind an algorithm to check this condition, given in Sjöström (1991), can be used to give a simple necessary and...

In an important step forward Maskin [E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23–38] showed that two properties – monotonicity and no veto power – are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this...

In the last few years, the recent regulations of the Energy and Environment Policy of the European Union (EU) Energy Policy, together with the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have been aiming to increase the integration of renewable resources, and in particular of biogas, into the EU energy...