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's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312613
We model an online display advertising environment in which "performance'' advertisers can measure the value of individual impressions, whereas "brand" advertisers cannot. If advertiser values for ad opportunities are positively correlated, second-price auctions for impressions can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036133
Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286401
We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104602
- they self-select into different submarkets - or screening within the trading mechanism, or a combination of the two. We … show that, as the meeting technology improves, the equilibrium features more screening and less sorting. Interestingly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337698
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
Problem Definition: We consider a buyer that needs to source a fixed quantity. She faces several potential suppliers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012389768
During the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children were boarded out. The foster-parents' compensation was determined in English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly adverse selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423815
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041778
During the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children were boarded out. The foster-parents' compensation was determined in English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly adverse selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005197992