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Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000870092

Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes : a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency

Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy - 1991 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000825943

Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes : a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency

Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy - 1991 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000826500

Roy Radner and incentive theory

Maskin, Eric - In: Review of economic design : RED 6 (2001) 3/4, pp. 311-324

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001659062

Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes : a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency

Dutta, Prajit K. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 4 (1994) 4, pp. 483-503

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001161713

Moral hazard

Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000923503

Moral hazard

Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001327646

Chapter 26 Moral hazard

Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 869-903). 1994

This chapter discusses moral hazard. The principalagent relationship embodies a special form of moral hazard, which can be called one-sided, but moral hazard can also be many-sided. The paradigmatic model of many-sided moral hazard is the partnership in which there are many agents but no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024448