I study a career concerns model in which the principal receives information about the agent's performance from a possibly biased evaluator. The optimal bias solves the tradeoff between ex-post efficiency of the principal's decisions about the agent and incentive provision. It is "anti-agent"...

This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a...

A manager's current and potential future employers are continually assessing her or his ability. Such assessment is a crucial component of corporate governance and this chapter provides an overview of the research on that aspect of governance. In particular, we review how assessment generates...

In a laboratory experiment I investigate the role of perceived own ability in a multi-task setting with career concerns under fixed wages and under financial incentives with a higher weight on the task measured with noise. I find that in the absence of career concerns participants allocate...

We study the effects of multi-layered governance on firm risk by focusing on the interaction of two types of career concerns. Two Delaware court decisions, the validation of poison pill defenses (the Unitrin decision) implemented by staggered boards (the Wallace decision), reduced...