Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 35
Cover Image
Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507749
Cover Image
The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531724
Cover Image
How can incentives in unemployment insurance be improved? : theory and evidence
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - In: Indicators and policies to make work pay : proceedings …, (pp. 101-119). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003358849
Cover Image
Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - In: Journal of economic surveys 20 (2006) 3, pp. 357-386
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003335119
Cover Image
The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Cover Image
Which employers regard the threat of dismissal as a suitable incentive to motivate workers?
Jirjahn, Uwe - 2015
Using German establishment data, this study finds that the share of blue-collar workers, an outdated production technology and a high-wage policy increase the probability that employers regard the threat of dismissal as a suitable incentive. A participatory HRM policy, the incidence of a works...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529905
Cover Image
Financial incentives and loan officer behavior : multitasking and allocation of effort under an incomplete contract
Behr, Patrick; Drexler, Alejandro; Gropp, Reint; … - 2014 - This version: July 04, 2014
activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378353
Cover Image
Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carli, Francesco - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 105-119
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549038
Cover Image
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and … monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509411
Cover Image
The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662