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Blackmailing lobbyists
Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008907299
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On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers
Celik, Gorkem; Sayan, Serdar - In: Review of economic design : RED 12 (2008) 3, pp. 209-227
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003746406
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Corruption by design : bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing
Manion, Melanie - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 12 (1996) 1, pp. 167-195
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001200796
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How transparency may corrupt : experimental evidence from asymmetric public goods games
Khadjavi, Menusch; Lange, Andreas; Nicklisch, Andreas - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 142 (2017), pp. 468-481
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927458
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Predatory states and failing states : an agency perspective
Dixit, Avinash K. - 2006 - Rev.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003833044
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Corruption and entry deterrence
Emran, M. Shahe; Shilpi, Forhad J. - In: The Bangladesh development studies : the journal of the … 26 (2000) 4, pp. 69-87
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001653732
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Large contests without single crossing
Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Economic theory 74 (2022) 4, pp. 1043-1055
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488788
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Screening mechanism when online users have privacy concerns
Jacob, Jagan - In: International journal of revenue management : IJRM 11 (2019) 1/2, pp. 89-125
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012252048
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392733
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632