We consider a make-to-order supply chain where a retailer sells a product for a manufacturer. There is a single selling season, during which the retailer receives customer orders and then sends the orders to the manufacturer for fulfillment. The manufacturer privately exerts effort to install...

Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general single contract offer. We show that the...

In practice, interest expense can account for a large proportion of firms' costs, while the interest rate is often influenced by a firm's market prospect. In the presence of information asymmetry, a firm may have an incentive to borrow a larger amount, thereby signaling a high prospect to the...

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. Under a backlogging model, we show that the manufacturer's optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand...