The identification of information problems in different markets is challenging issue in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the identification of moral hazard from adverse selection and learning within the context of a multi-period dynamic model. We extend the model of Abbring et...

A critical assumption in the vast literature on inventory management has been that the current level of inventory is known to the decision maker. Some of the most celebrated results such as the optimality of base-stock policies have been obtained under this assumption. Yet it is often the case...

We consider a decentralized supply chain where a supplier sells goods to a retailer facing a general random demand over an infinite horizon. The retailer satisfies the demand to the extent of the inventory on hand. The retailer has private information about his inventory in each period and the...

We analyze the effect of ambiguous loss probabilities on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information. We characterize equilibria under actuarially fair pricing with preferences that are second-order ambiguity averse (have smooth indifference curves). We also show existence of...

We investigate the ambiguity spillover among international equity markets. We follow Brennan and Izhakian (2018) and develop monthly ambiguity measures using high-frequency trading data of equity indices. The ambiguity spillover demonstrates noticeable asymmetry. The US equity market is the...

We discuss the finding that cross-sectional characteristic based models have yielded portfolios with higher excess monthly returns but lower risk than their arbitrage pricing theory counterparts in an analysis of equity returns of stocks listed on the JSE. Under the assumption of general...

We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.

This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost-single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...