The study examines how the lack of comparable public peers (“informational uniqueness”) is related to a firm's disclosure policy and information environment. Having less information spillover from other public firms may present an information deficiency if it is not compensated by other...

This paper presents an optimal portfolio algorithm under equilibrium conditions to evaluate future cash flows. The Algorithm employs expected return-risk approximation of utility function and bivariate distribution of cash flows of an investment and returns on market portfolios. The proposed...

We study how information disclosure affects financial intermediation when the payoff to the long-term investment is risky. The analysis is based on a business-cycle version of the bank run model wherein a bank provides risk sharing to demand depositors who experience unobservable shocks to their...

Using a natural experiment of the staggered dissemination of trading information in the corporate bond market, we find that when public disclosure increases, private information production reduces. The reduction in information production is indicated by fewer bond analyst reports, fewer pages in...

We present a newly designed market experiment to study regulatory issues in markets with advice inspired by the models of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) and Inderst (2015). In line with our predictions, our experimental markets create conflicts of interest and unsuitable advice biased toward...

We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps...

We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers using a model that captures how they differentially impact short and long-term stock value. We identify a partial disclosure equilibrium in which firms in the lowest value region neither disclose nor...

We study a dynamic moral hazard setting where the manager has private ev- idence that predicts the firm's cash flows. When performance is low, bad news disclosure is rewarded by a lower borrowing cost relative to the no-evidence case. In contrast, no disclosure is associated with higher...