We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such...

Can search engines increase revenues by changing their position auctions? In this paper, I analyze position auctions with general pricing rules to answer this question. In these auctions, there are several items that are commonly ranked by bidders with unit demand. I show that revenues remain...

Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods. This affects the way coalitional bidding impacts auction...

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the...