We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter...

In first-price sealed-bid auctions, a power probability weighting function is observationally equivalent to a model of constant absolute risk aversion. By comparing auctions with different ceilings on a computerized opponent’s bid space, we can separate subjective probability weighting and...

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter...

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter...

This paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder’s probability of winning the auction. Messages are primarily used to reduce...