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In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the … mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism …-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts to a constraint on the problem. We formalize and clarify the …
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relational contracts are repeatedly newly negotiated during relationships. Negotiations take place with positive probability and … that existing relational contracts can depreciate and ensuing negotiations then treat previous informal agreements as …
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parties may leave all non-price decisions out of the contract. By thus arguing that the threat of renegotiation facilitates …Attempts to economize on bargaining costs imply that two parties may write a contract which is incomplete in the sense … post renegotiation of decisions initially delegated to them, contracts may be even more incomplete. In the limit, the …
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We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...
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