We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H...

We examine whether allowing publicly listed firms to adopt equity-based compensation increases shareholder value for firms domiciled in weak institutional environments. We test our idea using a series of regulations in China that allowed publicly listed Chinese firms to adopt equity-based...

This study investigates how adopting new performance measures affects the decision process through which supervisors make subjective adjustments. In our setting, the Chinese government substituted economic value added (EVA) for return on equity (ROE) in the performance score formula it uses to...

We examine how China's adoption of a new set of Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) that is substantially converged with the IFRS affects the managerial pay-for-accounting performance sensitivity of publicly listed Chinese firms. We find that central-government-controlled firms adopted an...

This study investigates how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects the contractual benefits of using accounting information to determine executive compensation in China. After controlling for firm and corporate governance characteristics, we find...

This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to...

This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to...

The Split Share Structure Reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements. We predict this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...