Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

This paper compares the results of the three state of the art climate-energy-economy models IMACLIM-R, ReMIND-R, and WITCH to assess the costs of climate change mitigation in scenarios in which the implementation of a global climate agreement is delayed or major emitters decide to participate in...

This report primarily aims to provide both dispatch and wholesale spot price forecasts for the proposed hybrid gas-solar thermal plant at Collinsville, Queensland, Australia for its lifetime 2017-47. These forecasts are to facilitate Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) negotiations and to evaluate...

The primary aim of this report is to produce hourly yield projections of electricity power for the proposed LFR plant at Collinsville, Queensland, Australia based on the environmental condition between 2007 and 2013. However, the techniques and methods used to overcome the inadequacies of the...

Large public investments in clean energy technology arguably constitute an industrial policy. One rationale points to market failures that have not been corrected by other policies, most notably greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on oil. Another inspiration for clean energy policy reflects...

This paper uses a new model of a competitive electricity market to investigate the role of storage in markets dominated by hydro generation. Competition among generators leads to an endogenous shadow price of stored water, which facilitates the efficient intra-day and inter-season substitution...

The damage function in the famous climate-economy model DICE has received much criticism. Weitzman (2010) has proposed an alternative approach that gives more serious attention to climate change impacts for larger temperature increases. We calculate optimal climate policy with DICE using this...

Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

Central banks are increasingly focused on the risks from climate change for the economy and financial system. Two sets of risks are of particular concern: physical risks from more frequent and severe weather events, and transition risks from the move toward a lower-carbon intensive economy. This...