In a multi-task, market-based promotion tournament model, under different environments concerning employer learning about worker ability, it is shown that:i) Asymmetric learning in multi-task jobs is a necessary condition for "strategic shirking" (i.e., underperforming on certain tasks to...

We provide a theoretical analysis of promotion tournaments in which workers 'strategically shirk' by purposely under-performing on tasks that are de-emphasized in a promotion rule, while over-performing in tasks that are emphasized in the rule, thereby increasing their chances of promotion and a...

In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is...

In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team's performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases...