We examine the performance and compensation implications of firms' decisions to combine the roles of CEO and board chairman (duality). We document that firms that split the CEO and chairman positions due to investor pressure have significantly lower announcement returns and subsequent...

The questions of whether there ever existed excessive risk-taking incentives from executive compensation in the financial industry, and whether top executives of financial services firms actually responded to such excessive incentives that eventually led to the crisis remain unanswered. The...

This article explores regulatory developments with regard to employee representation in post-socialist corporate governance systems of Central Europe. It sets out to weigh the applicability of different theories on postsocialist industrial relations that focus on domestic, European and...

Pyramids, cross-ownership, rings and other complex features are frequent in the European and Japanese industrial world. The dissection of these structures requires a proper measurement of indirect shareholdings. While some authors use the (generally overestimated) data coming from legal...

Using the 2004 United Kingdom Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2004), this paper examines the impact of corporate governance on HRM practices and employment relations outcomes within organizations in the UK. The analysis suggests that when a remote external stake-holder is assigned...

Occupational Health and Safety Governance (OHSG) is a branch of Corporate Governance by which the board directs and controls labor risks created by their own enterprise. The OHSG concept is relatively new; unlike Occupational Health and Safety Management, which is mostly related to the work of...

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

We analyze the dynamics of the Japanese board network from 2004 until 2013. We find that the network exhibits some clustering with visible firm conglomerates. Ties between firms are rather persistent, despite noticeable churning among directors. Ownership relations explain only a small fraction...