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themselves. This increased deception may be driven by the anticipation that their lies will be indirectly reciprocated. Indeed …, Study 3 found that deception decreased when the chain of delegations was broken (i.e., A represents B and B represents C …). Moreover, self-report measures suggested that increased deception in simultaneous cyclic network was indeed due to anticipated …
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The market for retail financial products (e.g., investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
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reached. We study two decision-elicitation methods: the strategy and the direct response methods. For each method, deception …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191235
, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and …-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772519
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259275
equilibrium. All individuals have the same deception ability in such a stable state. In contrast, there are non-pure outcomes in … which non-Nash outcomes are played, and different deception abilities co-exist. We extend our model to study preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206884
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010800999
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688075