Empirical research on the principal-agent model has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief … executive officers. However, the model is also directly relevant to the incentives provided to other top executives. Furthermore …, the extent to which other executives will be provided with high-powered incentives to maximize firm profits depends …

types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt …

compensation is more relevant for maintaining long-term incentives when the other compensation components are temporarily …

biased either upwards or downwards in the regression estimate of CEO incentives, relative to the Board of Directors’ choice … of CEO incentives. Intuitively, net accounting measures include executive compensation, and the additional covariances …

to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and … investment are increasing in managerial incentives. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment … shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …