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We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when workers compare their own performance with the performances of co-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed within the framework of rank-order tournaments which are frequently used in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343963
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333998
We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when workers compare their own performance with a given standard or with the performances of co-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262021
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263109
We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when workers compare their own performance with a given standard or with the performances of co-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is analysed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263111
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players.At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stagetwo, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneouslyinvest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009354148
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430294