Stand der Literatur -- Datenbasis -- Empirische Untersuchungen zu den Anreizen von Fondsmanagern -- Empirische Untersuchungen zur Höhe der Risikoanpassungen -- Empirische Untersuchungen zu den Strategien der Risikoanpassungen -- Schlussbemerkungen.

Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self-serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent....

Publicly traded firms in the U.S. typically determine C.E.O. compensation by benchmarking the pay of their C.E.O.s against the pay of C.E.O.s in “peer” firms. The naming of particular peer companies by individual firms constitutes a supra-firm relational structure (network) in which an...