The paper analyzes the interplay of product market competition and governance on CEO compensation in Italian listed firms from 2000 to 2011 and tests the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on pay-performance sensitivity. We argue that important differences both in the level of compensation...

This study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between dividend payout ratios, executive compensation and agency costs in Italy. Corporate governance in Italy is distinguished by the fact that a large number of Italian firms are family-controlled, which may theoretically reduce...

We study the managers' compensation schemes adopted by publicly listed family firms by means of a theoretical model and an empirical analysis. Existing empirical literature finds puzzling evidence about the structure of family CEOs' pay, which apparently contradicts the fundamental tenets of...

The conflict of interest between shareholders in insider-dominated firms generates the agency problem of profit diversion, which intensifies when the controlling shareholder is the CEO. In a theoretical model, we show that incentive contracts can be employed to discipline diversion, and how they...