We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

In den siebziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wurden viele Staaten Westeuropas von einem beispiellosen Strukturwandel erfasst: Die Fabriken der alten Industrien verschwanden, Millionen von Arbeitsplätzen gingen verloren, vormals boomende Städte gerieten in die Krise und neue soziale Fragen...