This paper is concerned with the stategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information. The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as...

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.

In this paper, I first prove an integral representation theorem: Every quasi-integral on a Stone lattice can be represented by a unique upper-continuous capacity. I then apply this representation theorem to study the topological structure of the space of all upper-continuous capacities on a...

This paper explains how the Gibbs sampler can be used to perform Bayesian inference on GARCH models. Although the Gibbs sampler is usually based on the analytical knowledge of the full conditional posterior densities, such knowledge is not available in regression models with GARCH errors. We...

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. How ever, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...