Regulated firms are not necessarily willing to invest in cost minimizing technologies, but evaluate different technologies according to their impact on the information rent. In a two-type adverse selection model three kinds of investments are considered: investments that increase the probability...

Asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment. Selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increase the parent multinational's information...

Motivated by repeated play of non-cooperative games, we study equation solving undertaken in parallel by several non-communicating agents, each dealing with his own block of variables. The process is akin to Newton's method in using derivative information. It does, however, proceed without...

A multinational enterprise is subject to taxation by two jurisdictions who compete to capture its rents, while being aware that the firm also has investment options outside these jurisdictions. The firm has private informatio about its efficiency. We show that a higher outside option for the...

This paper examines the empirical importance of randomisation bias in a Norwegian randomised field trial on a rehabilitation programme for sick listed worders. Inclusion of participants in the trial was base on information obtained from administrative social insurance records. Professional...

Consider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values. Suppose the auction designer can make the bidders learn their value before entry. Such early information will induce screening of high-value bidders, and it will give rise to information...

When a government cannot commit to future policies, investors face the risk of opportunistic behavior in addition to uncertain market conditions. We show that although reducing market uncertainty is sometimes essential for investment, it may aggravate problems of opportunism.

Corruption opportunities arise when a principal delegates enforcement or audit authority to a supervisor. The supervisor may then strike a deal with the agent she is supposed to monitor and conceal important information from the principal. Corruption imposes a constraint on governance and...

The paper presents some recent research that examines, in the principal-agent framework, interaction effects of organizational design and incentives in the presence of asymmetric information and limited commitments.