Common Agency with Outside Options; the Case of International Taxation of an MNE.

A multinational enterprise is subject to taxation by two jurisdictions who compete to capture its rents, while being aware that the firm also has investment options outside these jurisdictions. The firm has private informatio about its efficiency. We show that a higher outside option for the firm may actually be beneficial for the taxing countries when they compete.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Olsen, T.E. ; Osmundsen, P.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	INFORMATION \| TAXATION \| COMPETITION

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	40 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647123