This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...

In this study, we explore the relation between job characteristics and employees' self-evaluations of performance in comparison to their colleagues' performance. Making use of unique individual panel data of ten large firms in Germany's chemical industry, we focus on monetary rewards (bonus...

In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving...

The globalization era requires employees to have good performance and results. Therefore, many companies implement compensation system. Effective compensation is expected to add value to employee's satisfaction to stimulate employees to always work better. This research aim is to determine the...

Recent incentive compensation trends suggest that many firms are (a) increasing the frequency with which they reward their employees and (b) providing gift-like unconditional rewards to employees irrespective of performance. This study investigates how reward frequency and reward conditionality...