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In the standard theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Countries may behave morally with...
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In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
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We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which differ in the size of the rooms to be filled, the...
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