Renegotiation-proof climate agreements with full participation : conditions for Pareto-efficiency
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Asheim, Geir B. ; Holtsmark, Bjart |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 43.2009, 4, p. 519-533
|
Subject: | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency |
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