We analyze a Cournot duopoly market with differentiated goods and the separation between ownership and control. We consider a delegation game, for which the owner of a firm hires a manager who acts as if the good has a lower degree of substitutability than it really has. This is so either...

We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm’s performance and more for their rivals’ performance if an industry’s firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

Walter Eucken hat die Institution der Haftungsbeschränkung radikal abgelehnt. Aus seiner Sicht war nur das Prinzip der Vollhaftung marktkonform. Diese Auffassung ist korrekturbedürftig, wie unter Rückgriff auf die moderne Mikroökonomik der Risikoallokation gezeigt wird: Zum einen kann es...

It is well-known that failing to achieve key organizational goals may pressure managers to commit fraud, but can it be a facilitating factor in cartel formation as well? The purpose of this study is to understand if firms known to have been in a cartel were under financial stress in the period...

In this study we use import penetration as a proxy for foreign competition in order to empirically analyze (1) the impact of foreign competition on managerial compensation, (2) differences in the impact between Germany and the U.S and (3) whether the impact of import penetration is driven by...