Innovation is the principle driver of firm and economic growth. Thus one disturbing trend that may explain stagnant growth is a 65% decline in firms' RQ. We propose that the rise of outside CEOs is partially responsible for the decline. While this proposition was motivated by interviews with...

We explore how an organization's financial misconduct may affect pay for former employees not implicated in wrongdoing. Drawing on stigma theory we hypothesize that although such alumni did not participate in the financial misconduct and they had left the organization years before the...

We investigate the relationship of CEOs' political preferences (as reflected in their political contributions) with the prevalence and compensation of women in leadership positions at U.S. public companies. We find that CEOs who favor the Democratic Party (“Democratic CEOs”) are associated...

This study aims to explore the gender differences in the relationships between leader-member exchange (LMX), job embeddedness, and turnover intention. Hypotheses formulation was conducted by integrating conservation of resources (COR) theory and social role theory, and data were collected from...

Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is associated with a greater intensity of applicant screening. In...

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

Executive remuneration is often criticised as being excessive and not clearly linked to firm performance. This study further examines the link between pay and performance by examining the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives. Our hypotheses draw on tournament theory of labour...

We investigate two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a firm's long-term wage policy. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns. The second claims that bonuses act as complements to an executive's internal career. Our...