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A model of person-pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements
Wowak, Adam J.; Hambrick, Donald C. - In: Strategic management journal 31 (2010) 8, pp. 803-821
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003993517
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Managerial compensation and risk-taking in banks
I, Ho jun; Yeo, Eunjung; Yoon, Kyoungsoo - In: Post-crisis regulatory reforms to secure financial …, (pp. 337-368). 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008939324
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Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion
Chaigneau, Pierre - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355527
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Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Armstrong, Christopher; Vashishtha, Rahul - In: Journal of financial economics 104 (2012) 1, pp. 70-88
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009550151
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The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts
Chaigneau, Pierre - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009552241
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Compensation framing and the risk-taking behavior of the CEO : testing the influence of alternative reference points
Larraza-Kintana, Martin; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.; Wiseman, … - In: Management research : the journal of the Iberoamerican … 9 (2011) 1, pp. 32-55
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009260842
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Why taxing executives' bonuses fosters risk-taking behaviour
Grossmann, Martin; Lang, Markus; Dietl, Helmut - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009489273
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Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation
Chaigneau, Pierre - In: The European journal of finance 21 (2015) 13/15, pp. 1357-1373
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419883
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How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949