We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO...

We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive CEO-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm...

We develop a tractable equilibrium model of competing firms in an industry to show how the distribution of firm qualities, moral hazard, and product market characteristics interact to affect firm size, managerial compensation, and market structure. Equilibrium effects cause different...

We develop a unified model of the interactions among investors, fund companies and fund managers. We show that the interplay between a manager's incentives from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a non-monotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and...